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"Why do you cry, Gloria? Robbie was only a machine, just a nasty old
machine. He wasn't alive at all."
"He was not no machine!' screamed Gloria, fiercely and
ungrammatically. 'He was aperson just like you and me and he was my
friend."'
-Isaac Asimov




There seem to be two schools of thought on the legal status of
sophisticated androids. One view, associated with the philosopher Hilary
Putnam, is that we ought to take advantage of the fact that
sophisticated androids do not yet exist in order to think about the
problem in a relatively disinterested and a politically more liberal,
inclusionary way.' The contrasting view is that we can best decide such
cases on the basis of our personally lived experiences with sophisticated
androids. It is certainly arguable that it is easier to marginalize those
with whom we are unfamiliar, as opposed to those with whom we have
personal experience.4
* Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. The author would like to
thank Timothy Hoff, Jason Odom, and Summer Talley.
' Isaac Asimov, "Robbie," in I, ROBOT 1, 14 (1991X1950).
2 Colin McGinn, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD
177 (1999).
' See Hilary Putnam, Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?, 61 J. Phil. 668,
678 (1964). Putnam's assumptions, at least as of 1964, were that "it is entirely possible
that robots will one day exist, and argue 'we are conscious!' In that event, what are today
only philosophical prejudices of a traditional anthropocentric and mentalistic kind would
all too likely develop into conservative political attitudes. But fortunately, we today have
the advantage of being able to discuss this problem disinterestedly, and a little more
chance, therefore, of arriving at the correct answer." Id. (emphasis in the original).
" By way of analogy, see S.F. Sapontzis,A Critique of Personhood, 91 Ethics 607,614
(1981). Sapontzis argues that "[t]he traditional tactic of discounting ... animal
expressions of moral virtue as merely instinctual or reflexive and, therefore, lacking
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This article will, in a rather loose sense, test these alternative
approaches by examining some of the direct and vicarious experiences
we have had with the best-known sophisticated android, Lieutenant
Commander Data of the Starship Enterprise. In particular, I focus on
the occasion in which Data's legal personhood5 was explicitly called into
question and judicially resolved. In the course of our inquiry, it will turn
out that the greater one's personal interaction with Data, the more
likely one is, generally, to think of Data as a person. We notice how
difficult it is for anyone to deny or suspend belief in Data's personhood
without engaging in what appears to be something like an actual
performative contradiction.
Of course, any kind of contradiction can be resolved in more than
one way. It's possible that someone might decide, in the face of their own
self-contradictory behavior, to consistently treat Data as a non-person.
But just such a choice can then itself be judged on various grounds. We
can then ask and investigate how a decision to treat Data as a non-
person affects the treatment of other, utterly uncontroversial persons.
This kind of consideration is loosely suggested by Kant's discussion of
the idea of duties toward animals and machines," but is also a pragmatic
concern. We are asking at this stage how regarding Data as a non-
person would tend to affect the moral dimensions of that person's
relationship with other persons, and, if we wish to broaden the inquiry,
with non-persons other than Data. If it turns out that those who regard
Data as a non-person tend to be specially insensitive toward or
prejudiced with respect to some classes of uncontroversial persons, we
might want to infer that morality requires treating Data as a person.
moral significance is itself an expression of ignorance and species prejudice. Only those
who have never lived with and cared for animals can believe that they are merely bundles
of instincts and reflexes lacking individuality, reason, and freedom." Id.
' There is really no neutral, uncontroversial way to formulate the questions involved
in our cases of concern. What we are looking for, and how we recognize it when we see it,
are distinctly at issue. Certainly, even the idea of 'personhood" itself, whatever its
criteria, may pose problems in that the idea is often thought to have both an empirical or
descriptive component-what qualities are necessary or sufficient for personhood?-and
a normative component, in which personhood involves recognizing or conferring a certain
elevated moral or legal status, such that a relatively elaborate set of moral rights or
responsibilities are properly ascribed to the bearer. See id. at 607-08. For an account of
what we might call the collective social construction of persons, see Dwight Van de Vate,
The Problem of Robot Consciousness, 31 Phil. & Phenom. Res. 149 (1971).
' See generally Immanuel Kant, LECTURES ON ETiHCs 239-42 (Louis Infield trans.
1963X1930).
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If it were possible to perform an observational test,7 with a clear and
objective outcome, of the being in question to determine personhood,
recourse to performative contradictions would not be necessary. But
there does not seem to be any such test.'
Nor, for that matter, can we simply decide minimally close cases of
personhood in favor of the putative person. A bias toward progressive
inclusion has appeal. But every decision in favor of inclusion within
personhood unavoidably leaves a new borderline case to decide. It is not
obvious, despite the moral value of personhood inclusiveness, that
morality counsels us to limitlessly expand the personhood category
through endless incorporation of each new borderline case. There might
admittedly be moral value in deciding close cases in favor of
personhood.9 But as the class of personhood expands, the resulting
moral conflicts and general moral costs increase.
Moral and legal personhood, despite their intrinsic moral value, also
confer relative status in the event of conflicts of interest. As we expand
the class of recognized moral and legal persons, we confer not just
desirable rights in general, but rights as against other sorts of persons,
including those who are most clearly persons. At some point, as with
protozoans or wheat grains, the costs of conferring personhood and its
associated rights may come at the substantial expense of the interests
7 See, e.g., Alan M. Turing, "Computer Machinery and Intelligence," in Margaret A.
Boden (ed.), THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 40-53 1990); John R. Searle,
"Minds, Brains, and Programs," in id. at 67, 85 ("[tlhe Turing test is... unashamedly
behaviouristic and operationalistic .... "); Colin McGinn, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME:
CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD 189 (1999Xthe Turing test is not focusing on
what is essential to consciousness: the possession of what it's likeness, simple sentience");
John R. Searle, THE REDISCOVERY OF MIND 71 (1994)"as far as the ontology of
consciousness is concerned, behavior is simply irrelevant. We could have identical
behavior in two different systems, one of which is conscious, and the other totally
unconscious"). But cf David J. Chalmers, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A
FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 315 (1996X"any system with the right sort of functional
organization is conscious, no matter what it is made out of").
8 See e.g., Amdlie 0. Rorty, Slaves and Machines, 22 Analysis 118, 120 (1962). See also
Hilary Putnam, supra note 3, at 691 ("the question that titles this paper calls for a
decision and not a discovery").
' By way of loose analogy, see Lee Bollinger, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986Xdiscussing the value of judicial toleration of speech arguably
close to the borderline of protection-worthiness.) For discussion of the ways in which the
distinction between personhood and nonpersonhood is not always sharp or binary, see




of animals, including humans.' ° Would we want cows to starve rather
than, say, violate the rights of wheat? At some point, the limitless
expansion of personhood begins to lose its appeal.
Of course, we may, for all we know, have much distance to travel in
expanding the scope of the category of personhood before severe and
unattractive tradeoffs begin to arise. Let us turn, then, to the case of the
particular sophisticated android with whom, it is fair to say, we have the
most vivid and detailed set of experiences, Commander Data.
II. COMMANDER DATA AND THE MEASURE OF A MAN
In "The Measure of a Man," the sophisticated android, Lieutenant
Commander Data is put on trial to determine his moral and legal
personhood his defenders believe Data possesses. Data and his putative
status and rights are defended by the redoubtable Captain Jean Luc
Picard. Dr. Bruce Maddox, an accomplished robotics expert who
contends that Data is not a person is represented by the profoundly
ambivalent First Officer William Riker. Presiding over the hearing, and
determining its legal outcome, is Captain Phillipa Louvois of the
understaffed local Judge Advocate General's office. Phillipa (as she is
referred to) and Picard happen to share an intensely ambivalent past.
The scripted version of the episode"1 opens at a holographic,
swimming pool created aboard the Starship Enterprise. Data joins his
colleagues and fellow officers Riker, Geordi, Worf, Dr. Pulaski, and
Wesley Crusher. Data is preparing to swim for the first time, and is,
apparently, anxiously attempting to reassure himself through reciting
0 Thus the moral revulsion we feel at having racially-based slaves do dangerous or
tedious work clearly cannot be extended, say, to sympathy for a contemporary computer
that is set to "work" for an extended time on a complex mathematical calculation,
however tedious or time-consuming we would find the calculation without computer
assistance.
" The account of "Measure of a Man" follows, and will be paginally cited to, a copy of
a script labeled Final Draft, December 6, 1988, and numbered 40272-135. This choice is
for mere ease of reference, as there are quite material differences between this version
of the script and the broadcast version currently available on videotape. The script
version is also generally more verbally elaborated. Copies of the script are most readily
available for purchase through "Script Shop," <www.scriptshop.com>. The videocassette
version of the episode first aired the week of February 13, 1989 as episode 35, no. 40270-
135, stardate 42523.7. The video is currently available from Paramount Pictures,
copyright 1994. Relevant text and video is also currently available through Professor
David Anderson's website, <www.ptproject.ilstu.edu> (soon to be replaced by a new
website) (visited February 17, 2001).
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an Archimedean mantra concerning specific gravity. 2 Ironically, Data
is at this point emphasizing what he shares even with mere inert
substances, rather than, in classic Aristotelian 3 or Thomistic 4 terms,
how he might claim to possess categorically higher capacities. Dr.
Pulaski immediately calls attention to Data's status by referring to"CPR
. . . or whatever you do to an android."15 Data's swim is comically
unsuccessful, due to his apparent miscalculation, and the humans, along
with Worf, manifest various sorts of genuine concern for his welfare.
Data, however, eventually emerges unscathed.
Picard's relationship with Captain Phillipa Louvois, Data's ultimate
judge, is sufficiently rich to raise a possible recusal issue, which, given
the limitations of her new Starbase, no one seems inclined to pursue.
Their prior relationship is, as it turns out, linked to the legal adversary
process as an engine for discovering the truth.
Dr. Maddox, backed by Star Fleet's Admiral Nakamura, announces
his intention to refit, upgrade, and multiply Data. Dr. Maddox
consistently refers to Data as an "it,""' unlike virtually everyone else
who regularly interacts with Data. Data suggests that Dr. Maddox's
proposed experimental procedures pose risks, including to his identity
that Dr. Maddox rejects as absurd and unrealistic.17 It seems clear that
were Data human, Data's informed consent to the proposed procedures
would be required.1
Captain Picard has, early on, perhaps understandably focused on his
own prerogatives, the welfare of his crew, and the efficiency of ship
operations. The deeper issues are first alluded to by Data's friend
Geordi. Picard's focus changes a bit in response to Admiral Nakamura's
belief that Data is only a machine, and that "an army of these
machines"19 may, if Maddox is right, be in the offing. Picard, in response,
12 Final Draft at 3.
I3 See Aristotle, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 75 (J.A.I. Thomson trans. 1976X1953)
(distinguishing plants, animals, and humans on the basis of proper function).
14 See, e.g., F.C. Copleston, AQUINAS 159-60 (1955); Brian Davies, THE THOUGHT OF
THOMAS AQUINAS 210-11 (1992). In a broader context, see E.M.W. Tillyard, THEELIZABETHAN WORLD PICTURE 27-28 (n.d.) and, at greater length, Arthur 0. Lovejoy, THE
GREAT CHAIN OF BEING (1936).
1r Final Draft at 4.
is Final Draft at 15, 16.
17 Final Draft at 16.
" Informed consent by competent human beings to non-emergency experimental
medical procedures is addressed not only by tort law, see, e.g., Lipscomb Memorial Hosp.,
733 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1984), but, in applicable circumstances, by federal regulations. See,
e.g., 21 C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. A, pt. 50, subpt. B (1998).
'9 Final Draft at 20.
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includes Data among his "people," and when Admiral Nakamura insists
again that Data is "a machine," Picard adds firmly, if rather hazily, "and
so are we, just a different kind of machine." '° It is unclear whether
Picard's view at this point is that we are all just machines, or that some
machines, including Data and humans, are also ensouled machines with
an essential spiritual element. Admiral Nakamura breezes past this
crucial distinction, countering, as do the personified Laws in Plato's
Crito,2 1 that we as Data's builders retain certain rights over him. Picard
responds that making or building something does not necessarily confer
broad, permanent ownership rights.2"
Later, Data attempts to articulate his reservations to Picard. Data,
who has on many occasions put his life at serious risk for crew and
mission,23 reports that he considers Dr. Maddox's proposed procedure to
be "too much like dying,"24 even if the procedure were in some sense a
success. Picard responds by opining that humans do have, or themselves
are, spirits, but these spirits depend on constant containment within an
assigned bodily container, where as Data's does not.2 At this point, Data
articulates his concern for a possible loss of the continuity of his identity,
of who he is, even if Maddox's experimental upgrades are successful.
While software and programmed information can be temporarily stored
elsewhere and then returned to a rebooted unit, Data fears, however
inarticulately, that the rebooted self will be a different, truncated self.26
At this point, Picard observes, oblivious to its implications, that
Starfleet officers all take a binding, solemn oath to serve.27 Data points
out the clear superiority of Geordi's artificial eyes to the natural
biological human eye and wonders why humans cannot be compelled to
undergo upgrades. Picard has no answer. Doubtless humans have a
certain attachment to much of their original equipment, except in the
case of cosmetic surgery or a purportedly enhanced appearance. Data
20 Id.
21 See Plato, "Crito," mi R. George Wright (ed.), LEGAL AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 1, 7-11 (1992).
2 Final Draft at 20-21. For an interesting contrast, see John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, second treatise, ch. 2, § 6 (Legal Classics Library ed. 1994)(human persons
as God's property); id. at ch. 5, § 27 (property interests as created by mixture of a given
person's labor with previously unowned natural materials).
2 While Data is immune from any number of human physiological vulnerabilities,
Data regularly risks his continued existence, in an apparently understanding fashion.
24 Final Draft at 22.
2 Final Draft at 23.
26 Id.
2? Final Draft at 23 ("lilt's precisely because you are a Starfleet officer that they can.
We take an oath to serve"Xemphasis in the original).
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draws the conclusion that he would not be required to undergo the
procedure if he were human. Picard is left speechless.
Picard, disturbed by the encounter with Data, confesses to Riker a
"distressing tendency toward bigotry" in the case. By themselves,
words like bigotry, prejudice or discriminatory are ambiguous. Picard
might mean that he has assumed Data to be a merely mechanical non-
person, and that Picard now sees that such a conclusion is wrong on the
merits. Or Picard might mean that he had assumed Data to be merely
a mechanical non-person, but that he should have held this as an open,
unresolved question. Picard himself confesses to some uncertainty as to
his own attitude." Is Data as a new life-form or a mere machine?
Picard then goes to his nemesis/neutral arbiter Captain Philipa
Louvois, who seems to regard Data as a machine, and who like Picard
fails to recognize the contradiction in holding Data responsible for risks
entailed by his voluntary and free choice to enter Starfleet 0 and his oath
as a Starfleet officer while holding to the notion that Data is a machine
incapable of choice and oath. Phillipa's initial assumption that Data has
a valid legal right to resign from Starfleet and thus avoid Maddox's
experiment bespeaks yet another contradiction. Toasters, or computers,
cannot voluntarily resign. At this point, Picard speaks in the language
of fairness, justice, and rights held by Data.
In a charged scene, Data then responds to what he apparently takes
to be Maddox's impertinent intrusion by pointing out that "[iut is
customary to request permission before entering an individual's
quarters."31 Data thereby implicitly asserts the dignity of a person, as
opposed to the sheerly instrumental, unfeeling, insensate status of a
complex mechanism. Their desultory conversation is of interest for
Data's assertion that "living is not composed merely of the accumulation
of information, but by the very experience of life,"3 2 and, more
dramatically, that there is an "ineffable quality" to his memory and an
untransferable soul or heart of his experiences that cannot simply be
downloaded as Maddox imagines.33 Maddox announces, fervently if
ambiguously, that he does not care how Data "feels."
2 Final Draft at 24.
2 Final Draft at 25.
'" Final Draft at 26. Phillipa argues that "we agree to certain risks when we join
Starfleet." Id.
S' Final Draft at 28.
31 Final Draft at 28. Compare, e.g., the concern for what it is like to experientially be
somebody, as explored in David J. Chalmers, THE CONSCIOUSMINDXI (1996) and Thomas
Nagel, THE VIEW FRoM NOwHERE 7, 15(1986).
3 Final Draft at 29.
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While Maddox continues to refer to Data as a human appearing
"it,"' heis not above the tendency to anthropomorphism, as when he
refers to his anticipated legions of Datas as "our faithful automatons."35
At this point, Phillipa responds by perhaps inadvertently including Data
within the class of "people" not subject to seizure in the name of
scientific advance.' Those who do not know Data refer to him as an "it,"
but then gradually use more personal language as they gain more direct
experience with Data.37
Maddox argues that the Enterprise's central computer would not
have the right to refuse an upgrade even if that computer were somehow
so disposed." Picard has begun to focus on the familiar administrative
law principle that Starfleet, like any other similar authoritative
institution, should not "ignore its own regulations when they become
inconvenient."39 It will turn out to be this general principle of
consistency, commitment, or estoppel' that gives bite to the
contradictions in which Starfleet and Data's antagonists regularly
ensnare themselves. It is more difficult than they realize to consistently
think of Data as a machine.
Data clearly has the capacity to at least mimic, in a typically
endearing way, human emotional responses and human foibles.41 Such
behavior largely drives the inquiry into whether Data is, if not in any
sense human; a "new life-form" as opposed to a machine;42 whether he
34 Final Draft at 31.
3 Final Draft at 31.
• Final Draft at 32.
3 See, e.g., the observations of Commander Riker, Final Draft at 35.
3 Final Draft at 33.
" Final Draft at 32. See e.g., Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.
1974); Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and, at least by way of influential
dicta, Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
, See generally Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Stewart, Cass R. Sunstein & Matthew
L. Spitzer, ADMINISTRATWVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 415-549 (4th ed. 1999). More
particularly, see Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 758
F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Occasionally, courts will allow agencies to depart from their
own internal rules in the sake of greater leniency for the affected private party. See
Breyer et al., supra, at 519. Presumably, Starfleet could not in this case argue that now
refusing to recognize Data's status as a legal person, despite its own past practices, would
amount to treating Data with special leniency.
,1 See, e.g., Data's arguably excessive concern for the reusability of gift wrapping paper,
Final Draft at 33-34. Of course, for most of his career, Data professes to be incapable of
emotions.
4 Final Draft at 36.
Vol. 25
The Legal Status of Sophisticated Androids
has emotions or a soul,4 whether he is sentient,44 conscious,45 or self-
conscious;46 whether he has interests;47 or genuine intelligence;" or is
merely a lower-order entity that may belong, as property,49 to a person
or group.
The judicial hearing itself is to be presided over, and the facts and
legal outcome to be determined, by Captain Phillipa Louvois. She has,
contrary to general administrative law principles, 0 structured the
hearing as a sort of de novo appeal from her own summary ruling that
Data is not a sentient being, but mere property, and therefore lacks the
legal right either to refuse Maddox's refit or to resign from Starfleet.
Phillipa argues that ajudgment in Data's favor would result in collateral
estoppel"l or res judicata"2 with the effect that, in Phillipa's words, "he'll
never need fear the Doctor Maddoxes any longer.""3 Again, we are left
to wonder whether Phillipa's reference to Data's 'fear' is mere casual,
convenient anthropomorphism, of the sort Daniel Dennett reports of
4' Final Draft at 36. Final Draft at 36,47, Again, Data himself typically disclaims any
capacity for emotion. Surely, though, this would not by itself establish his non-
personhood. Surely a Vulcan who utterly destroyed any capacity for emotion would not
thereby forfeit personhood.
"Final Draft at 39,43,60. The Oxford English Dictionary defines sentience in terms
of consciousness or susceptibility to sensation. See 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 757
(J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989). Cf. Daniel C. Dennett, KINDS OF MINDS
65 (1996X"[s]entience has never been given a proper definition, but it is the more or less
standard term for what is imagined to be the lowest grade of consciousness").
45 Final Draft at 61. Curiously, the most interesting O.E.D. definition of consciousness
seems to refer more precisely to self-consciousness. See Oxford English Dictionary, (Vol.
3), supra note 71, at 757 ("the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or
affections'").
4 Final Draft at 61.
'7 Final Draft at 43. It is often argued that a being's interests are logically prerequisite
to having rights. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Legal Rights, 4 Ox. J. Legal Stud. 1, 5 (1984);
Michael J. Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk Nor the Critique of Rights Too Seriously,
62 Tex. L. Rev. 1405, 1416 n.19 (1984).
48 Final Draft at 43, 60-62.
49 Final Draft at 39, 64.
' See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (195oXrather broadly
disapproving of the practice of administrative adjudications presided over by
administrative officers who have themselves personally called the affected party's status
into serious question).
51 Final Draft at 40. For discussion of the legal doctrine of collateral estoppel, see, e.g.,
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
" Final Draft at 40. For discussion of the legal doctrine of res judicata, see, e.g.,
Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
6 Final Draft at 40.
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Maine loggers with regard to trees," or yet another instance of the
contradictions in which Starfleet finds itself ensnared.
By regulation, it falls to Commander Riker, the direct subordinate
of Captain Picard, to judicially represent the Starfleet view that Data is
non-sentient and a non-person, with no legal rights beyond, of course,
those procedural rights that could not be denied without making the
hearing meaningless. Commander Riker is profoundly disturbed at
being placed in this position, not from the conflict inherent in opposing
Captain Picard, who will be defending Data, but from Riker's horror at
playing a role in any official denial of Data's personhood, in which Riker
has come to entertain no doubt.
Data, ever-reflective, echoes in conversation the classic arguments
of Plato's Crito. In particular, Data observes that "in many ways I have
always considered myself to belong to Starfleet. You activated me,
rescued me, educated me, employed me." Ironically, it is just such
grateful sentiments on Data's part that typically lead us to believe that
Data is not only a person, but a responsible person, even worthy of
emulation. Data's admission of his many social dependencies, and his
avoidance of false claims of self-sufficiency, make him sound all the
more human.55 His detachment seems the detachment of responsible
moral reflection, not of mechanical isolation.
As the discussion continues, Picard's defense of Data's personhood
is premised on his qualities of intelligence and sentience and that Data
can "belong to no one" but himself.' A critic might argue that Data
cannot have meaningful rights unless he also has genuine interests, on
the view that interests are prior to rights. Whether Data has interests
is an open question, and one that perhaps should be central to the
judicial inquiry. Data himself seems at least casually to assume that he
does possess, as in his response to Picard that he, Data, has "complete
confidence in your ability to represent my interests."57
Meanwhile, Riker's preparation for Data's hearing is dogged by
conflicts and ambivalence. His faith in the logic and practice of
adversarial litigation, at least in this case, is utterly nonexistent. He
"See Daniel Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood," in Amblie 0. Rorty (ed.), THE
IDENTrrIEsOFPERSONS 175,180(1976); Daniel C. Dennett, KINDS OFMINDs 33-34 (1996).
For an interesting further contribution by Dennett, see Daniel C. Dennett, "The Practical
Requirements For Making a Conscious Robot," <cogsci.soton.ac.uk/-harnad/Papers/
PylO4/dennett.rob.html>.
' See generally the social communitarianism of Michael Sandel, as embodied in, e.g.,
Michael J. Sandel, LIBERALISM AND THE LumTS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998).
6Final Draft at 43.57 Final Draft at 43.
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recognizes that the official Starfleet view have been met with veiled to
overt hostility on the part of the crew. There is sentiment among the
crew that Riker's adversarial role involves a betrayal of his friend Data.
Again, the language is revealing. We do not betray toasters, or even
complex machinery. The idea of betrayal suggests the violation of a faith
and confidence properly engendered in a conscious, interested being to
whom something better is owed.'
Riker calls Data to the witness stand. No oath of truth-telling is
administered, allowing Riker and Starfleet to evade a potentially
devastating contradiction: if an oath of truth-telling amounts only to
Data's mechanical speech act predicting that he will not objectively
mislead the tribunal, no contradiction need be involved. But if an oath
of truth-telling must be undertaken knowingly and of one's own free
will, as a solemn commitment to choose one's answers with integrity, or
to deliberate before answering, would concede that Data is capable of
understanding, agreeing to, and adhering to such an oath and would
torpedo the case against him.
Instead, Data is scanned on the witness stand, and the computer
voice begins to announce his name, rank, assignment, and service
record.59 Riker interrupts to object to the recitation, and Picard insists
that the recitation continue. Phillipa Louvois overrules the objection,
and we hear, interestingly, that among Data's awards is something
called the Starfleet Command Decoration for Gallantry.' Again, a
contradiction looms. Does Starfleet, or anyone else, solemnly and
officially credit machines, sophisticated or otherwise, with the quality
of gallantry? Has the Enterprise's computer, given its life-saving work
performances, ever been seriously considered for any comparable award?
The emotional highlight of the hearing, comes when Riker removes
Data's hand, irreverently toys with it, and then, without apparent
consent, melodramatically presses Data's on-off switch, leaving him, as
Riker has it, a Pinocchio with his strings cut, built by an inventor and
now temporarily deactivated by a mere man."1 Riker's theatrics aside,
he has established nothing that was in contest, or that could not have
been shown in less degrading fashion. While Riker thereby dramatically
58 See, e.g., lago's behavior in William Shakespeare, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO
(Penguin 1958XGerald E. Bentley ed.).
59 Final Draft at 49.50.
60 Id.
81 Final Draft at 50-53. For good measure, Rikerdemonstrativelyestablishes that Data
is far stronger than the ordinary human being. Final Draft at 51. The logic is questionable




shows how Data differs from most humans who cannot be dissembled or
switched off. But we cannot limit the concept of a person to only those
beings who very closely resemble most human beings in even the most
superficial respects. We can certainly imagine a genuine person with a
detachable limb or even an off switch. We can also imagine Riker's
theatrics backfiring if an adjudicator saw those tactics as an assault on
Data's real or at least arguable fundamental dignity and right to bodily
integrity.62
After a court recess and an initially despairing consultation with
Guinan, ' Picard begins his rebuttal by noting the limited significance
of Riker's demonstration. Picard then seeks to metaphorically humanize
Data by establishing that Data has kept his Starfleet medals not from
any narrowly utilitarian or functional motive, but, perhaps, from sheer
vanity, a distinctly familiar human foible.6 Picard gradually overcomes
Data's reticence to reveal his intimacy with former crewmate Tasha Yar.
Phillipa Louvois is at least momentarily startled by this revelation;
whether it plays much of a role in her ultimate disposition of the case is
left to conjecture.
From there, Picard borrows Riker's tactic of establishing the
uncontested. Based on Data's sophisticated verbal responses, it appears
to any neutral observer that Data is aware of his physical and social
surroundings, and of the nature of his legal jeopardy. ' Data appears to
manifest sufficient self-awareness to qualify for personhood. Picard then
closes with the parlor stunt of establishing that Commander Maddox
cannot clearly and objectively prove that Commander Riker is himself
a genuinely rational and intelligent person." Maddox retreats to a bare,
insistent intuitionism, which Picard immediately compares to the
discredited intuitionist method of recognizing pornography.
Phillipa, acting as the judge, pauses only briefly after Picard's
closing argument. She finds Data to be a legal person rather than
' Consider, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952)(applying a "shocks
the conscience" test to involuntary stomach pumping by police in order to obtain two
morphine capsules swallowed by defendant).
a This conversation is more richly developed in the televised or videocassette version,
in which Guinan delicately leads Picard to think about the human history of chattel
slavery and its doctrines and rationales.
Final Draft at 57.
Final Draft at 61.
Final Draft at 60-62. This would be the "other minds" chestnut. Snce at least
Descartes, some of us have been haunted by the worry that our own mind may be real,
but those of others merely cleverly created illusions or otherwise unreal. See, e.g., Alvin
Plantinga, GODANDOTHERMINDS (1967); Thomas Nagel, OTHERMINDS: CRMrICAL ESSAYS
1969-1994 (1995).
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property, and to possess, among other rights, the right to refuse
Maddox's experimental refit. The script then concludes as Phillipa
claims partial vindication of the adversarial system, and as Riker
reconciles with the apparently understanding, forgiving, modest, and
grateful Data.67
The Data story presents most of the familiar considerations in
determining who should count as a person.' The adversarial battle has
focused on considerations such as intelligence, consciousness or self-
consciousness, sentience, and even ensoulment. We would, however,
probably not want to say that Data is a person, even if he possesses all
the above, if nothing that Data does, that happens to, or that is done to
Data ever genuinely matters to Data. On this point, we can perhaps look
to moments such as Data's awkward expression of the loss he will feel
in missing his friend and crewmate Geordi, or his understandable desire
to keep his holocube portrait of Tasha Yar. As far as we can tell, Data
seems not only genuinely self-conscious, but to have genuine subjective
and objective interests as well, including the desire not to be riskily
dismantled.
III. CONCLUSION
As we accumulate personal experience with Data, we are more likely
to credit Data with personhood. Experience with Data, after all, may
mean only that we are exposed to a wider range of Data's quirky,
idiosyncratic behavior, which we naturally tend to anthropomorphize as
mindful. The empathic Counselor Deanna Troi herself senses no mind
67 Final Draft at 64-66. While Data is apparently thus judicially vindicated, Data's
ultimate eschatological disposition has been vigorously contested. See Norman Lillegard,
No Good News for DATA, 44 Cross Currents 1 (1994); James F. Sennett, Lillegard Leads
Us in a False Dilemma, 46 Cross Currents 195 (1996); Wesley J. Wildman, But
Consciousness Isn't Everything, 46 Cross Currents 215 (1996); Norman Lillegard, No
Requiem For Androids: A Reply to Sennett and Wildman, 48 Cross Currents 429 (1998).
" See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Memorial Hosp., 733 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1984Xscope of informed
consent by surgical patient in absence of actual emergency). But cf Doe v. Sullivan, 938
F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 199lXno due process violation in use without informed consent of
unapproved investigational drugs on service member in combat-related situation). See
generally 21 C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. A, pt. 50, subpt. B (1998Xon informed consent of human
subjects and exceptions thereto).
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in Data, 9 and concedes that this may be due either to the sheer
alienness of Data's mind,70 or to its utter nonexistence.
A problem arises in Starfleet's institutional decision to administer
and accept Data's sworn oath to Starfleet as a free and knowledge act.
Presumably Starfleet does not administer or receive oaths from toasters,
computers, or other entities, incapable of such oaths. In now claiming
that Data is and presumably always has been incapable of a solemn
oath, Starfleet seems to be placing itself in a rather awkward logical
bind.
Pointing out the existence of something akin to a performative
contradiction can be a powerful rhetorical and logical weapon. It is
difficult, for example, to convincingly argue one's own current non-
existence. 71 It is also difficult for a free and voluntary inquirer to
contend that broad-based knowledge is not a good thing."2 Historically,
the institution of slavery has embodied and been discussed in terms of
various sorts of performative contradictions." Consider, by way of loose
example, Frederick Douglass' account of a practice engaged in by one of
his slavemasters:
When I carried to him my weekly wages, he would, after counting the
money, look me in the face with a robber-like fierceness, and ask, "Is
this all?" He was satisfied with nothing less than the last cent. He
would, however, when I made him six dollars, sometimes give me six
cents, to encourage me. It had the opposite effect. I regarded it as a sort
of admission of my right to the whole. The fact that he gave me any
part of my wages was proof, to my mind, that he believed me entitled
to the whole of them.74
69 Final Draft at 36.
70 Cf the observations of Isaac Asimov's robot Herbie: "'I see into minds, you see,' the
robot continued, 'and you have no idea how complicated they are. I can't begin to
understand everything because my own mind has so little in common with them .... "
Isaac Asimov, "Liar!," in I, ROBOT 111, 116, (1991X1950).
71 See Pierre Schlag, Law asthe Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 Cal. L. Rev.
427, 435-36 (1997)(discussing the Cartesian cogito). See also Isaac Asimov, "Reason,* in
I, ROBOT, supra note at 56, 61-62 ('I began at the one sure assumption I felt permitted
to make. I, myself, exist, because I think--' Powell groaned, 'Oh, Jupiter, a robot
Descartes!').
' See John Finnis, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS 74-75 (1980)(distinguishing
among various sorts of broad contradictoriness).
73 See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, "Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An
American Slave," in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 15, 17 (1994)(discussing racial intermarriage and
siblinghood); id. at 71 (preference among slavemasters that slaves drink, rather than read
the Bible, on Sundays).
74 Id. at 86.
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It is difficult, if not impossible, for slaveowners to avoid grotesque logical
embarrassments. Nor is the problem of performative contradiction in the
legal sphere confined to contexts as invidious as that of slavery as
Jiirgen Habermas makes clear in his work on communicative ethics.75
' See Jiirgen Habermas, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE
ETHICS 162-63 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans. 1993); JUrgen Habermas, MORALCONSCIOUSNESS
AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 80, 89 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson
trans. 1990); David Couzens Hoy & Thomas McCarthy, CRITICAL THEORY 209 n.1
(1994)(discussing Habermas); J. Donald Moon, "Practical Discourse and Communicative
Ethics," in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS 143, 149 (Stephen K. White ed.
(1995Xsame). See also Karl-Otto Apel, "Is the Ethics of the Ideal Communication
Community a Utopia? On the Relationship between Ethics, Utopia, and the Critique of
Utopia," in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY 23, 43 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred
Dallmayr eds. 1990); (finding a "pragmatic self-contradiction" in assertions such as "I
hereby assert as true that I am not obliged in principle to recognize all possible members
of the unlimited community of argumentation as having equal rights"Xemphasis in the
original).
Of course, a communicative ethics presumably accords great moral significance to
the present or future ability to "speak" or otherwise communicate in demarcating the
bounds of the moral community. See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action, supra, at 89 (referring to 'every subject with the competence to
speak and act"); Jurgen Habermas, Justification and Application, supra, at 50 (referring
to "an ideal communication community encompassing all subjects capable of speech and
action"); Thomas McCarthy, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS 306 (1996)
(1978); Simone Chambers, "Discourse and Democratic Practices," in The Cambridge
Companion to Habernas, supra, at 233, 238 ("no one with the competency to speak may
be excluded from discourse"); Karl-Otto Apel, "Regulative Ideas or Truth-Happening?: An
Attempt to Answer the Question of the Conditions of the Possibility of Valid
Understanding," in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER 67, 86 (Lewis Edwin
Hahn ed. 1997)(referring to "partners in the discourse"); Robert Alexy, "A Theory of
Practical Discourse," in The Communicative Ethics Controversy, supra, at 151, 166
(referring to Habermas's view that'[alnyone who can speak may take part in discourse").
See also Daniel Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood," in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS,
supra note 52, at 178.
Actually it is far from clear whether Habermas would want his general emphasis on
the ability to speak, or even to communicate, to translate directly into the context of our
own concerns. Should the ability to communicate, let alone to speak, constitute either a
necessary or a sufficient condition of moral personhood? See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett,
KINDS OF MINDS 12 (1996X"[t]alking... is not necessary for having a mind"). Could there
be a clearly non-conscious robot, clearly lacking personhood, who nonetheless can speak
or communicate? Do some or all animals who can feel pain also have the ability to
communicate? Habermas himself seems to extend his focus to include all those who will
somehow be affected by application of a particular norm. See Habermas, Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action, supra, at 65 ("valid norms must deserve
recognition by all concered"Xemphasis in the original); David Couzens Hoy & Thomas
McCarthy, supra at 55 ("as Habermas conceives of it, practical discourse demands of
participants that they take into consideration the needs and interests of all those who will
be affected by the outcome of their deliberations"). Habermas may thus not intend a
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Any contradiction, however, admits of two possible resolutions.
Starfleet might now contend, for example, that its only error was in
originally believing Data to be capable of a genuine oath. There is thus
no guarantee that any performative contradiction of which Starfleet is
guilty would have to be resolved in favor of acknowledging Data's
personhood. And since it also seems at least possible that even
prolonged, careful empirical observation of Data will not tell us whether
he is conscious,76 we may well need a more comprehensive test for
personhood, perhaps of the sort suggested by Immanuel Kant.
According to Kant, we cannot owe moral duties to non-human
animals.7" But Kant does not conclude from this that what we do to
animals is of no moral significance. Treating animals kindly or cruelly,
Kant assumes, tends indirectly over time to shape and be reflected in
the moral quality of our treatment of genuine persons. 8 Thus Kant
concludes that "[t ] ender feelings toward dumb animals develop humane
feelings towards mankind." 9
Kant would presumably be open to the idea that even if we consider
Data as a complex machine, our treatment of Data may somehow come
to affect the morality of our actions toward persons.8 0 We need not
assume that Data is, or is not, a person. We would instead assume that
given the closeness of Data's case, some persons would choose to
consider Data as a person, and others would not. As our experiences
accumulate, we would compare the decision as to Data's personhood
with their treatment of uncontroversial persons. So we might ask of
animal rights activists: Do they tend to act in a more praiseworthy way
toward other human beings than do persons who are not animal rights
activists?
We should not assume, without evidence, that those who regard
Data as a person will tend to be more moral generally than those who do
not. One might speculate that those inclined to expand the class of
communicative ethics to answer the question of who counts, beyond including all
communicative human persons.
76 See, e.g., Am6lie 0. Rorty, Slaves and Machines, 22 Analysis 118, 120 (1962)
(following Kant in arguing that willing, resolving, and making moral decisions are not
subject to empirical observation). See also supra note 6 and accompanying text, as well
as Professor Steve Pinker's discussion of the robot Alicia in Steve Pinker, Can a Computer
be Conscious?, 123 U.S. News & World Report 63 (Aug. 18, 1997Xno experimental test for
sentient consciousness possible).
See Immanuel Kant, LEcTUTREs ON ETHIcS 239 (Louis Infield trans. 1963X1930).
7 See id. at 239-40.
7 Id. at 240.
'o For Kant's brief extension of his discussion of animals to the context of inanimate
objects, see id. at 241.
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persons might also tend to dilute the duties owed toward all persons.
(We can imagine a dog-exalting misanthrope.) Professor Colin McGinn
has recently raised the issue of the possible conflicts of interest between
robots and uncontroversial persons. Should they [robots] be allowed to
get married and reproduce themselves? How do their rights compare to
the rights of animals? Are some robots "more equal than others?" Will
it ever be okay to sacrifice a single human to save a thousand innocent
robots?81
In the absence of satisfactory empirical tests for the qualities we
choose to deem relevant,82 we may wish to address such questions
through each of the steps described above, in succession.
s' See McGinn, supra 2, at 177.
Beyond questions of self-consciousness we might, consider the capacity of a being for
having "second-order" desires. These would include desires to maintain or to change one's
basic priorities or one's present desires, as when we wish to break a habit. See, e.g., Harry
G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in John Martin Fischer
(ed.), MORAL RESPONSIILITY 65, 67 1986X"[nlo animal other than man... appears to
have the capacity for ... the formation of second-order desires). Cf Daniel Dennett,
"Conditions of Personhood,* in THE IDENTTIES OF PERSONS, supra note 54, at 181 ("[nlow
are human beings the only second-order Intentional system so far as we know? I take this
to be an empirical question'). This kind of inquiry, assuming its moral significance, only
takes us so far. In some sense, Data clearly appears to have and indeed emphasize second
order desires, most especially to become more fully or more nearly human, or to better
appreciate what it is like to be human, as in a remarkable conversation between Data and
Mr. Spock, in which the two confess to directly opposing attitudes toward the role and
value of emotion. But this leaves open the crucial question: does Data really have second
order desires, or has he merely been designed and programmed to effectively mimic the
behavioral dimension of genuinely having second order desires?
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